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PROSECUTION OF NON-INDIANS FOR NON-SERIOUS OFFENSES
COMMITTED AGAINST INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
VICTOR H. HOLCOMB*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government has exclusive authority to prosecute crimes
committed on Indian lands by non-Indians against Indians. I Thus, when
the perpetrator is non-Indian, Indian tribes and their separate members
are entirely dependent on the federal government for the benefits of
meaningful law enforcement that other Americans receive from state and
local governments. 2 Unfortunately, the federal government does not
take its responsibilities as seriously as it should, with the result that
Indians may often be easy prey for non-Indian criminals, who may tar-
get reservation lands for this very reason. 3 This lax enforcement is par-
ticularly pronounced in the area of non-serious offenses, on which the
federal government is less inclined to expend its resources. 4
This Article explores both the source of this problem and its impli-
cations, as well as potential solutions. Part II reviews the background of
the issue, including the statutory basis of the government's power, the
scope of its obligations, and the scope of the problem. Part III explores
the constitutional implications of this problem. Finally, Part IV suggests
some potential modifications to the current approach.
II. BACKGROUND
The following section addresses the background of the issue,
beginning with an explanation of the basis of the federal government's
power over non-Indian-on-Indian crime committed in Indian territory.
* Member of Ohio Bar.
1. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990) ("Mhe inherent sovereignty of the Indian
tribes does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reserv-
ation").
3. See Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: Assert-
ing Congress's Plenary Power to Restore Territorial Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 1051, 1055 (1998)
(stating that the inability of tribes to prosecute non-Indian offenders "encourages lawlessness by
non-Indians while they are in Indian country").
4. See id. at 1054 (noting the federal government's hesitancy to prosecute minor crimes).
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A. THE SOURCE OF FEDERAL POWER OVER NON-INDIAN CRIME IN
INDIAN TERRITORY
Congress passed the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (herein-
after "§ 1152") in 1817.5 The purpose of the Act was to permit pun-
ishment of all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian territory.
6
Presently, the statute reads as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws
of the United States as to the punishment of offenses com-
mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States,. except the District of Columbia, shall extend
to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to
any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who
has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case
where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively. 7
The Act thus imported into Indian country the entire body of
criminal law applicable to enclaves, such as national parks and military
installations. 8 Initially, this body of law was comprised of a scattered
collection of federal statutes that allowed punishment of individual
crimes. 9 This piecemeal legislation, therefore, represented only portions
of a complete criminal code, and in response, Congress in 1825 passed
the Assimilative Crimes Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 13, which reads in
part:
Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any
act or omission which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or
omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory,
Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the
laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall
be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment. 10
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
6. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 144-45 (3d ed. 1998).
7. 18U.S.C.§ 1152.
8. See C ANBY, supra note 6, at 145; see also ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., A MERICAN INDIAN LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 279 (3d ed. 1991).
9. CANBY, supra note 6, at 146.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
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This provision had the effect of making state criminal law applicable to
any offense, not otherwise specifically addressed by a separate federal
statute, when committed on a federal enclave. I1 Section 13, which applies
to all federal enclaves, was therefore automatically applicable to Indian
lands by virtue of § 1152.12
Taken together, §§ 1152 and 13 have been interpreted as giving the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute offenses commit-
ted on Indian lands when the defendant is non-Indian and the offense is
committed against either Indians or Indian interests. 13 Thus, in United
States v. McBratneyl4 and Draper v. United States, 15 the Supreme Court
held that while the states have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by
non-Indians against non-Indians, the federal government retains jurisdic-
tion when the crimes are against either Indians or Indian property.1 6 In
Donnelly v. United States,17 the Court further emphasized that although
states have exclusive jurisdiction for "white on white" crime, the federal
government retains sole jurisdiction where an Indian is victimized by
"whites and others not of Indian blood."18
Therefore, only the federal government may prosecute crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian territory.1 9 As the
following discussion shows, however, having the power to prosecute such
offenses does not mean the government has the obligation to do so.
B. THE SOURCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS TO
PROTECT INDIANS AGAINST NON-INDIAN CRIME
From the beginning, all the "discoverers" of the North American
Continent saw American Indians as something barely, if not less than,
human. As the world has come to understand, this was, and largely
remains, characteristic of the Anglo and Western European view of
persons who are something other than white. 20 This self-perceived
11. CANBY, supra note 6, at 147.
12. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Juris-
dictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 532-33 (1976) (stating that the Assimilative Crimes Act applies
in Indian country).
13. CANBY, supra note 6, at 148; see also Clinton, supra note 12, at 523-24 (stating that the
prevailing rule is that federal jurisdiction under § 1152 is exclusive).
14. 104U.S. 621 (1881).
15. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
16. See generally Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1881).
17. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
18. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271-72 (1913).
19. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 523 n.94 (stating that "the federal jurisdiction conferred by sec-
tions 1152 and 1153 is exclusive; where one of these sections applies, the state has no jurisdiction").
20. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN I NDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT-THE DIS-
COURSES OF CONQUEST 8 (1990) (describing the theory behind colonial expansion to be that "the West's
religion, civilization, and knowledge are superior to the religions, civilizations, and knowledge of
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superiority was prevalent wherever Anglos and Western Europeans set-
tled. This perception, and blasphemous invocations of expansionism in
the name of Christianity, were recurrent justifications for the domination
of "aborigines" everywhere, including the North American Indians. 21
Thus, the governments of the various European colonies, confeder-
ated states, and United States decimated the various tribes without hesita-
tion. In the name of God and manifest destiny, Indians were subjected
to the worst imaginable horrors as the target of genocidal extermination,
both literally and culturally. 22 As is often the case with issues of moral
implication, courts of law merely rubber-stamped the will of the majori-
ty, which soon internalized the notion that the Indian was of no signifi-
cance in the great scheme of things, particularly the white man's scheme
of things. The judiciary, being a branch of the same government that
authorized and encouraged subjugation of the Indian, merely had the
task of imputing legitimacy, or at least the appearance thereof, into this
great scheme.
In the 1823 Supreme Court case of Johnson v. M'Intosh,23 Chief
Justice Marshall held that upon the "discovery" of North America, the
continent was free for the taking by the various European countries,
whose title thereto was established merely by taking possession. 24
Moreover, once title was established by possession, it was a right to be
respected by all other European nations and with which no other Euro-
pean nation could interfere. 25 The Indians were "admitted to be the
rightful occupants of the soil," but, even here, "discovery gave an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest." 26 Further, while the claims of the European
countries may "have been maintained and established . . .by the
sword," such methods found "some excuse, if not justification, in the
character and habits of the [Indians] whose rights [were] wrested from
them." 27
Having committed itself to these views, it was not surprising that,
after Congress passed legislation authorizing confiscation of Indian
non-Western peoples").
21. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 576-78 (1823) (discussing England's
15th, 16th, and 17th century discovery commissions, which limited themselves to discovery and posses-
sion of lands "then unknown to Christian people" or "remote, heathen and barbarous lands as were not
actually possessed by any Christian prince or people").
22. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8; see also B.J. Jones, In Their Native Lands: The Legal
Status of American Indian Children in North Dakota, 75 N.D. L. REV. 241, 247-48 (1999) (describing
how federal authorities used Indian children as the "agents of change" to assimilate Indians into white
American culture).
23. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
24. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 574.
27. Id. at 588-89.
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lands and removal of Indians from within state boundaries to western
located reservations, the Supreme Court also found, in the 1831 case of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 28 that the Cherokee nation did not have
standing to challenge such removal. 29 The Cherokee nation, in seeking
injunctive relief to prevent Georgia's annexation of Cherokee lands, had
invoked the original jurisdiction of the Court under Article Three,
Section Two of the Constitution, which allows the Court to hear contro-
versies "between a state or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or
subjects." 30
In deciding that the Cherokee Nation did not qualify as a "foreign
state," Chief Justice Marshall did not precisely identify the political
status of Indians. 31 Rather, after stating that "[t]he condition of the
Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps, unlike that of any
other two people in existence," 32 he merely elaborated upon "federal
trusteeship" notions introduced in M'Intosh, the core of which is that the
various tribes are subjugated to the interests of the United States, mean-
ing that whatever the political status of the tribes is labeled, their exis-
tence is entirely at the sufferance of the United States. 33 Consequently,
while Cherokee Nation may have suggested that the tribes "look to [the
federal] government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
[and] appeal to it for relief to their wants," 34 nothing in that case re-
quired the federal government to extend these benefits to Indians. 35 If
anything, Cherokee Nation merely gave the green light for the states,
pursuant to federal authority, to weaken the ability of the tribes to
protect and provide for themselves. 36
In the wake of Cherokee Nation and Congress' legislative recogni-
tion of relocation of Indians as national policy, the states freely enacted
legislation which either relocated the tribes, curtailed their political
growth, or both. While doing so, it was common for the states, which
desired to establish sovereignty within their borders, to project the juris-
diction of their own courts into tribal lands and simultaneously invalidate
whatever system the Indians might have had in place for trying and
punishing crimes committed on the reservation. 37
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
29. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
30. Id. at 15.
31. See id. at 15-20.
32. Id. at 16.




37. See generally CLINTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 11-18.
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The next major developments in this area were in the 1978 United
States Supreme Court case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.38 In
Oliphant, the Court made it absolutely clear that tribal courts have no
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. 39 In arriving at this conclusion,
the Court basically reiterated precedent to the effect that Indians occupy
reservations with the assent of the United States and that reservations are
within the territorial sovereignty of the United States.40 This was essen-
tially the same message announced in M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation,
that whatever rights and privileges tribes enjoy are at the sufferance of
the United States.4 1 Just as with these early cases, Oliphant dealt only
with limitations on tribal power; nowhere did it command the federal
government to extend protections, privileges or rights of any sort to the
tribes, either by virtue of a federal trusteeship or any other theory. 42 It
only recognized an obligation to protect the tribes when such an
agreement existed in a presently enforceable treaty, which, of course, can
be abrogated by the will of Congress. 43
Considering precedent, there is but one available conclusion regard-
ing the legal obligation of the federal government to protect the tribes:
There is no such obligation.44 Consequently, irrespective of the fact that
the right and power to prosecute is reserved exclusively to the federal
government through § 1152, and possibly the federal trusteeship theory,
there is nonetheless no duty or obligation of the federal government to
prosecute non-Indian defendants who commit crimes on Indian lands. 45
The implications of this lack of obligation are explored in the following
section.
C. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The significance of the federal government's failure to prosecute
non-serious offenses committed on Indian lands by non-Indians against
Indians is common knowledge amongst authors and commentators. The
following summary is illustrative:
38. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
39. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
40. See generally id.
41. See generally id; see generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831); John-
son v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
42. See generally Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.
43. See id. at 210 (stating that "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,
Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress").
44. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, the federal system is not geared towards prose-
cution of non-major crimes, most of which are misdemeanors.
Funds for prosecution of federal crimes are finite, requiring
busy prosecutors to allocate their resources as best they can.
As a result, crimes like assaults and [thefts] are simply not
prosecuted, which creates grave problems for tribes attempting
to police their reservation without the power to exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Moreover, the distance
between the federal courts and reservations can add to the prob-
lem. For example, the nearest federal courts and prosecutors to
the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana are Billings and Great
Falls, over 250 miles from the reservation. Several bills de-
signed to increase the number of federal prosecutors and place
federal magistrates in Indian country have been unsuccessful,
partly because of Indian opposition to the addition of another
layer of federal law enforcement in Indian country in place of
a solution that would strengthen tribal authority. See S. 2832,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 1177, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).46
Similarly, a former tribal special prosecutor had the following to say:
[N]on serious crimes by a non Indian against an Indian was not
really dealt with by federal prosecution. These federal mis-
demeanors have always been the "problem area" of the law.
The State and the Tribes would not touch this issue, for lack of
jurisdiction.
In essence, Federal prosecution for misdemeanor crimes were
relatively not pursued by the U.S. Attorney's department
unless it was found that the issue was a serious petty crime. It is
still common knowledge on this particular reservation, that a
non Indian person can get away with a misdemeanor crime
against an Indian person. Therefore, these acts of violence on
Indian people go unpunished and it is more of an open season
to assault Indians. The impact on the Reservation is one of
disdain and nothing more than another broken promise by the
Federal government. 47
46. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 330.
47. Letter from Bryce M. Wildcat, former Fort Peck Tribal Special Prosecutor (Nov. 17, 1998)
(on file with author).
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Although neither the government nor the tribes has compiled reliable
statistical data,48 such examples are credible evidence of the result of the
federal government's failure to prosecute in this area. Thus, while the
federal government has the exclusive power to prosecute these non-
serious offenses, the fact that it has no obligation to do so has allowed it
to neglect this power, leading to potential constitutional problems. 49 The
following section addresses these problems.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY THE PROBLEM
The foregoing discussion has reviewed the background of the juris-
dictional problems presented by non-Indian on Indian crime committed
in Indian country. The following section focuses on the constitutional
rights implicated by this problem, beginning with Fifth Amendment due
process.
A. DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall . . .be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."50 All persons
have a liberty interest in going about their business without being
victimized by others and in moving freely about in their daily endeavors
without fear of being attacked or otherwise abused.51 When the govern-
ment fails to provide that degree of law and order necessary for ensuring
these essential freedoms, it allows a deprivation of them without any
process of law whatsoever.5 2 This is especially true when the government
establishes itself as the only vehicle for protecting such freedoms and
prohibits all others from doing s0. 53 In such case, the government's
failure to provide the promised protection becomes the means by which
the wrongdoers are allowed to operate, and the government is essentially
an accessory to the wrongdoing. This is precisely the present state of
affairs in regards to non-serious crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians on Indian land.5 4 By establishing itself as the exclusive
48. See, e.g., infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (quoting Department of Justice Memo-
randum (stating that there is a "pervasive 'lack of reliable crime statistics in Indian Country')).
49. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 330.
50. U.S. CONST. amend V.
51. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (stating that "from the formation of the Union and the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested [a] great solicitude that its citizens be protected
by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty").
52. Cf. id. at 212 (stating that the Court was "not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian crime
on today's reservations which the tribes forcefully argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But
these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be
authorized to try non-Indians").
53. See id.
54. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1055 (noting how the present system has encouraged "a
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means by which such crimes are prosecuted, but then failing to honor
this obligation, it is in fact the government that is responsible for the
deprivation of these essential freedoms without any process of law. 55
Similarly, property rights include the abilities to use and preserve
one's property, as well as to exclude others from it.56 Indian-Americans
who are without sufficient law enforcement to prevent and deter crime
no doubt are required to suffer various physical injuries to both real and
personal property, as well as property common to their communities at
large.5 7 This directly interferes with their use of such property. 58 Fur-
ther, the value of these properties is necessarily diminished by criminal
activities directed against them. 59 Lastly, lack of meaningful law enforce-
ment means that individual citizens and their communities do not get the
benefit of the deterrent effect of effective law enforcement that would
discourage the presence of criminal offenders in the first instance-
offenders who are naturally lured to areas where law enforcement is
known to be lax or non-existent. 60 Therefore, the failure of the United
States government to honor its obligation to exercise exclusive juris-
diction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country deprives Indian victims of due process by deprivation of both
liberty and property interests. 61
Moreover, when the federal government becomes aware that its
policies are having a disproportionate detrimental effect on the rights of
a particular class of persons, to persist in adhering to such policies
without any rational basis for doing so is to injure such class knowingly,
which is no less than intentional, or de jure,62 discrimination. 63 This is
particularly true when the consequences of the policies disadvantage
fundamental lack of respect and even contempt for impotent tribal authorities").
55. See generally Clinton, supra note 12, at 523-24 (noting the federal government's exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians occurring in Indian country).
56. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., PROPERTY § 7.1 (1984) (listing "freedom from physical
intrusion" as one of the rights incident to possession of land).
57. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1055 (noting that "tribes [are] powerless to protect tribal proper-
ty, interests, and members from the criminal conduct of non-Indians").
58. Cf. Swartz v. Scruton, 964 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[a] substantive due
process claim can be brought in the context of property interests").
59. Cf. Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (stating that "[w]here there is a realistic threat of loss of property the mandates of the [due
process] clause apply").
60. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1055 (noting the "state of disarray in the current system").
61. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1054 (noting the federal government's hesitancy to prosecute
minor crimes committed by non-Indians on reservations).
62. "De jure" is defined as "[e]xisting by right or according to law." BLACK'S LAW DicnoNARY
437 (7th ed. 1999); see also Acha v. Beame, 438 F. Supp. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("De jure discrimi-
nation, in which a law or official policy expressly treats a class of persons in a less favorable manner,
is, by its nature, intentional").
63. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1975) (stating that "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another," but noting that disparate impact alone is not in
and of itself sufficient to establish a constitutional violation).
1999] 769
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
only that class (here, the Indian-Americans). It is no defense that Con-
gress did not intend for the separatist policies of § 1152 to work to the
disadvantage of Indians; de jure discrimination will exist if, in applying a
statute, federal prosecutors either create or perpetuate a discriminatory
result. 64 As the Supreme Court indicated in the 1954 case of Boiling v.
Sharpe,65 "[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process." 66 Certainly, completely depriving a particular class of
citizens of the ability to obtain justice from the courts for criminal
offenses committed against them is not justifiable on any grounds.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection analysis is appropriate whenever similarly situated
persons are treated differently. 67 As with other native-born Americans,
Indian-Americans are citizens both of the United States and of the indi-
vidual state where they reside. 68 National citizenship was bestowed on all
Indians born in the United States by congressional act in 1924,69 while
the Fourteenth Amendment also makes Indian-Americans citizens of the
states where they reside. 70 In terms of citizenship, therefore, Indian-
Americans are situated similarly to all other citizens. 71 Consequently, the
different treatment of criminal offenses committed on Indian lands in-
volving Indian victims injured by non-Indian defendants is amenable to
equal protection analysis. 72
Equal protection analysis requires the strictest standard of review,
known as strict scrutiny, when the class of affected persons is treated
differently because of immutable characteristics such as race, alienage,
national origin or gender, or when there is a fundamental right at issue. 73
64. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
65. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
66. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The Court noted that, while the Fifth Amendment
contains no express equal protection clause, "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Id.; see also Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (stating that the Court's "approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims [has] been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment").
67. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
68. See Jones, supra note 22, at 241 (describing the "unique legal status" of Indians as citizens of
their tribe, state, and country).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994).
70. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. See generally Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 41 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Similarly
situated neighbors have an equal right to share in the benefits of local government. It would obviously
be unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or police protection than the other...").
72. See generally Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10 ("The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classi-
fications It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in
all relevant respects alike").
73. In order to pass "strict scrutiny," a classification "must be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest and must be necessary to the accomplishment of its legitimate purpose." Palmore v.
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Fundamental rights are "[t]hose which have their origin in the express
terms of the Constitution or which are necessarily implied from those
terms." 74 The Supreme Court has, in previous cases, indicated that separ-
ate classification of Indian-Americans does not constitute classification
based on race, because such classification is based on tribal member-
ship, 75 and that consequently, such classifications are subject only to
rational basis review, a lower level of review. 76 However, this determin-
ation is disingenuous, given the fact that membership generally requires
some threshold amount of Indian ancestry. 77 Indeed, § 1152 has been
construed by commentators as reserving exclusive federal jurisdiction
only in regards to interracial crime committed on Indian lands, not to
interracial crime generally. 78 Strict scrutiny, therefore, is appropriate not
only because the Indian liberty and property interests at stake are within
the sphere of fundamental interests contemplated within the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, but because Indian-Americans, as a race,
are being subjected to treatment different from other citizens.
Moreover, as indicated above, at the point at which the federal
government is aware that its policy of exclusive federal jurisdiction for
non-Indian on Indian crime is particularly, if not exclusively, harmful to
Indian-Americans, continued adherence to the policy is tantamount to
intentional discrimination. As a general rule, when there is evidence that
a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in legislative or
administrative action, judicial deference to such action on the basis of
rational review is not appropriate. 79
Even if, for purposes of equal protection analysis, classifications
based on status as an Indian are evaluated according to rational basis
review, such classifications fail, because they are an arbitrary means of
affecting underlying governmental policy. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated on various occasions that classifications based on status as an
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (citations omitted).
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607 (5th ed. 1979).
75. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (noting the classification at issue
to be "political rather than racial" and pointing out that "it operate[d] to exclude many individuals who
are racially to be classified as 'Indians'); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646
(1977).
76. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (stating that "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied ration-
ally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will
not be disturbed"); see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating that
"[iln areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion").
77. CANBY, supra note 6, at 112.
78. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 12, at 526-27.
79. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (noting that
"racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration" to be balanced by legislators or
administrators).
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"Indian" are intended to "help" Indians and are a consequence of
"the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians." 80
However, the Court has also held that governmental activity at odds with
announced governmental policy is per se irrational. 8 1 In regards to
classifications based on status as being Indian, therefore, while the goals
of such classifications may, at least ostensibly, have been intended to
benefit Indians, the result of such classification is merely that many
non-Indian criminals are never punished. 82 Consequently, such laws
have, as indicated above, created a worse situation for Indian-Americans
by leaving them largely unprotected from non-Indians who commit
crimes on Indian lands. Thus, even if one assumes for the sake of discus-
sion that such classifications might be facially valid as rationally related
to a legitimate government interest, they are nonetheless violative of
equal protection as applied, because they yield a result wholly at odds
with the government objectives sought by such classifications.8 3
C. FIRST AMENDMENT
As indicated above, the Supreme Court has held on various occa-
sions that classifications based on status as an Indian are not racial,
because they are actually based on membership in a federally recog-
nized tribe.84 The Court has clarified this point by holding that because
of this distinction, such classifications are "political rather than racial in
nature." 85 Thus, classifications directed at Indians are in reality classifi-
cations directed at association in a political group.
In the 1976 case of Elrod v. Burns,8 6 the Supreme Court stated that
"political belief and association constitute the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment." 87 Elaborating upon this point, the
Court stated:
In Perry [v. Sinderman],88 the Court broadly rejected the
validity of limitations on First Amendment rights as a condition
to the receipt of a governmental benefit, stating that the govern-
ment "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
80. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552-53.
81. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 337 (1989).
82. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1054 (noting how "the federal court system is far too encum-
bered to prosecute the numerous minor crimes associated with life on the reservation").
83. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372-74 (1886) ("Mhough the law itself be fair on its
face, .. . if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, ...
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution").
84. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
85. Id.
86. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
87. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976).
88. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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infringes his constitutionally protected interests---especially, his
interests in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited.8 9
The direct consequence of the federal government's failure to prosecute
non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians, meaning persons who
are members of a federally recognized tribe, is that they are denied the
benefits of the criminal courts when victimized by non-Indians. Thus,
they are being penalized for their membership in the tribe, a political
organization. It is certainly foreseeable, if not probable, that certain
members would even forfeit their tribal membership for purposes of
avoiding such discrimination. At the least, those members who are
actually affected by the policy of exclusive federal jurisdiction in this
area are being discriminated against "solely because of [their] political
beliefs." 90
If any governmental scheme that invades the constitutional right to
associate freely with particular political groups is to survive constitutional
challenge, "it must further some vital government end that is least
restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and
the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected
rights." 9' Application of § 1152, whereby members of a tribe are ex-
cluded from the criminal courts when victimized by non-members,
furthers no vital government end and provides no benefit to the govern-
ment except that the costs of prosecution are saved. Such a "benefit"
hardly outweighs the loss of the affected tribal members, who are
stripped, without any procedural safeguard whatsoever, of those liberty
and property interests affected by crimes visited upon them by non-
Indians.92 Therefore, modification to the current system is required.
IV. MODIFICATION OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
The following section reviews several possible modifications to the
current system intended to reduce the problem discussed above.
89. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359.
90. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 510 (1980).
91. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362-63.
92. See Heisey, supra note 3. at 1055 (discussing the problems associated with the powerlessness
of tribal law enforcement over non-Indians).
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A. LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION
In the 1990 case of Duro v. Reina,93 the Supreme Court held that
tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
Congress responded by enacting legislation that immediately granted
jurisdiction to the tribes "over all Indians." 94 In so doing, Congress
clearly, albeit impliedly, expressed an intent to continue withholding
tribal jurisdiction in criminal matters over non-Indians. 95 Nonetheless,
Congress should be willing to give tribal courts jurisdiction over non-
Indians if inequities resulting from the present system become sufficient-
ly unpalatable. Moreover, Congress would no doubt arrive at some alter-
native to the current approach if faced with an order for injunctive relief,
issued by a federal court in behalf of Indian-Americans, requiring the
federal government to expend substantial sums for purposes of bringing
the number of relevant prosecutions up to some acceptable quantity.
On the other hand, there are serious procedural shortcomings which
weigh against tribal courts having jurisdiction over non-Indians. Take,
for example, the previously noted case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, in which the United States Supreme Court made clear that Indian
tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 96 In the
course of its opinion, the Court indicated that tribal courts do not
sufficiently guard rights considered fundamental under the constitutions
of the United States and the several states.97 As voluntary members of
the separate tribes, Indians are free to make themselves amenable to
tribal courts that disregard these rights, but the Court was not willing to
allow tribal courts to subject persons who are not members of the tribe to
the same treatment.98 Quoting in part from the 1883 Supreme Court
case Ex parte Crow Dog,99 the Court stated:
In Ex parte Crow Dog ... the Court was faced with almost the
inverse of the issue before us here-whether, prior to the
passage of the Major Crimes Act, federal courts had juris-
diction to try Indians who had offended against fellow Indians
93. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994); Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646
(1991); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 109 (1992) (describing the history of the legislative changes).
95. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 62 (1994) (noting the continuing inability
of tribes to try and punish non-Indians).
96. Oliphant v. Suquarnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
97. Id. at 193-94.
98. Id. at 212.
99. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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on reservation land. In concluding that criminal jurisdiction
was exclusively in the tribe, it found particular guidance in the
'nature and circumstances of the case.' The United States was
seeking to extend United States 'law, by argument and infer-
ence only, . . . over aliens and strangers; over the members of a
community separated by race [and] tradition . ... [with] the
restraints of an external and unknown code . . .; which judges
them by a standard made by others and not for them .. . . It
tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their
people, nor the law of their land, but by ...a different race,
according to the law of a social state of which they have an
imperfect conception . . . .' These considerations, applied here
to the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak equally
strongly against the ... contention that ... [the separate tribes]
retain the power to try non-Indians according to their own
customs and procedure.100
In particular, the Court in Oliphant took note of the fact that "the
Suquamish Tribe amended its Law and Order Code to provide that only
Suquamish tribal members shall serve as jurors in tribal court." 101 Such
a limitation is not only intuitively repugnant to notions of fairness; it is
also inimical to the Sixth Amendment's requirement that juries be drawn
only from a representative cross-section of the community where the
crime has been committed in order to help ensure the ideal of an
impartial jury.102 This is particularly so when the excluded members
make up a sizeable portion of the community. In Oliphant for example,
there were 2,928 non-Indians, and only fifty tribal members, living on
the reservation, and sixty-seven percent of reservation lands were owned
in fee simple by non-Indians.103
Another illustration of tribal court practices that militate against
entrusting tribal courts with the fate of non-Indians is when tribal court
proceedings, either in whole or part, are conducted in a native language
that a non-Indian party does not understand. One of the amicus curiae
briefs filed in the 1997 Supreme Court case of Strate v. A-i
Contractorsl0 4 makes this clear:
100. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11 (stating that "the United States has manifested an equally great
solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty").
101. Id. at 194 n.4.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193 n.l.
104. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
1999]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
[T]ribal court[s] can all too easily become a vehicle for the
deprivation of the outsider's right to due process. This is not
just an abstract fear. In 1995, BN was sued in tribal court on
the Crow Reservation in Montana by the survivors of two mem-
bers of the tribe killed in a railroad crossing accident on the
reservation. Red Wolf v. Burlington Northern R.R., Civ. No.
94-31 (Crow Tribal Ct.). In 1996 the case was tried to a jury
made up entirely of members of the tribe, including some who
were relatives of the plaintiffs. During jury selection, many po-
tential jurors expressed a deep-seated bias against the railroad.
That bias was echoed by the court itself when a judge (who was
not presiding over the case) addressed the venire panel in the
Crow language, telling them 'A train runs through the middle
of our land, Crows, you know, I don't have to tell you. Bodies,
in the past, bodies are scattered along the railway. Now, this is
the day.' Although the evidence showed that the driver and
her mother were intoxicated at the time of the accident, the jury
found BN 100% liable for wrongful death and awarded the five
heirs what the jury described as 'compensatory' damages in
the astonishing amount of $250 million. 105
Such incidents no doubt go a long way towards convincing the average
person, and probably the average lawmaker as well, that the prospect of
giving tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians should never
become more than just a possibility.
An additional consideration that would cut against giving tribal
courts jurisdiction over non-Indians pertains to the physical conditions
to which inmates in tribal jails are exposed. The Supreme Court has
made abundantly clear that constitutionally inadequate conditions of
confinement may entitle injured prisoners to bring an action directly
against the responsible government or government officials.106 In the
case of state prisoners, redress is sought either through habeas corpus
proceedings, a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,107 or on the
105. Brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., the American Automobile Association,
and Burlington Northern Railroad Company as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Strate v.
A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872). "After the tribal court refused to stay enforce-
ment of the judgment unless BN put up security for the entire amount, BN sought and obtained a
federal court injunction against enforcement. Plaintiffs appealed to the 9th Circuit, where the case
was argued in September 1996." Id. at 3 n.2 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Estates of Red Wolf and
Bull Tail, Nos. 96-35254 and 96-35265 (9th Cir. Sept. 1996)).
106. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497-98 (1973) (citations omitted) (discussing
the availability of both habeas corpus proceedings and § 1983 actions to state prisoners).
107. Id.
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basis of a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 108 In the
case of federal prisoners, remedy is sought under either the Eighth
Amendment1 09 or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.110
In an October 1997 Department of Justice memorandum to the
Attorney General and Secretary of the Interior entitled Report of the
Executive Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement Improve-
ments I 1 the deplorable condition of tribal jails and detention facilities is
discussed as part of the circumstances contributing to a law enforcement
"crisis" in Indian Country. The report states in part:
[Throughout Indian Country, t]here are 70 jails, including
detention and holding facilities, located on 55 reservations.
Most . . . are outdated, do not offer sufficient bed space for
current needs, do not meet jail or building codes, and present a
threat to the health and safety of inmates .... Many Indian
Country jails house both adults and juveniles.
Resources for equipment and supplies are such that, in some
jails, inmates receive no blankets or mattresses and no basic
hygiene items, such as soap or toothpaste. Staff sometimes buy
these basic items with their personal funds.
Detention operations in most Indian Country jails fall far short
of basic professional and BIA detention standards .... Opera-
tions are substandard in such critical areas as staff and inmate
safety; inmate supervision and management; inmate services
and programs; fire safety; hazardous substance control; sanita-
tion and pest control; and preventive maintenance. The design
of many of these old jails presents diverse health hazards,
including an inability to isolate inmates with communicable
diseases such as tuberculosis.
[M]ost Indian Country jails have insufficient staff to perform
all security, custody, and ancillary functions inherent to jail
operations. If staff cannot supervise inmates, they also cannot
prevent escapes, suicides, assaults, and vandalism.
108. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
109. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
110. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
111. Report of the Executive Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements
(1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/icredact.htm> (last visited Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Executive
Committee Report].
1999] 777
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Deficient jail operations are accompanied by completely anti-
quated and inadequate jail structures, which contribute to high
suicide rates. [footnote omitted] Most inmates in Indian
Country jails are sentenced for misdemeanor offenses .... 112
A fair interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe113 is that non-Indian citizens of the United
States do not "check their federally recognized rights at the door" upon
entering Indian Country. Therefore, non-Indians incarcerated in tribal
jails or detention facilities would retain the ability to bring actions direct-
ed to the conditions of their confinement. Certainly, conditions such as
those identified in the above excerpts from the Department of Justice
memorandum would provide a basis for such a claim.114 Simply giving
tribal courts jurisdiction over non-Indians thus has serious drawbacks.
B. PUBLIC LAW 280
Related to the issue of legislative modification is Public Law 280.115
As modified by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Public Law 280
allows a state, with approval by the affected tribe, to assert its criminal
jurisdiction over all crimes committed on Indian lands. 116 Generally, this
approach has not proved workable. 117 States do not have the authority
to tax Indians, and they are not willing to assume criminal jurisdiction
over Indian lands if they cannot be reimbursed, through taxation of In-
dians, for the costs of doing so. 118 Further, the federal government can-
not order the affected states to assume such jurisdiction. 119 The tribes
have also been generally opposed to the proposal, both because they are
not willing to pay taxes to a state to offset the state's ostensible "costs"
of extending state criminal jurisdiction onto Indian lands and because
states would be intruding upon their separate tribal sovereignty.1 20
Therefore, Public Law 280 may also prove ineffectual.121
112. Id.
113. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
114. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (recognizing an Eighth Amendment claim
on the basis of prisoner's exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke).
115. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 ,588 (1953).
116. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 548-49 (discussing Public Law 280).
117. See generally Jones, supra note 22, at 251 n.67 (describing Public Law 280 as "[t]he most
conspicuous example of federal legislation vesting states and state courts with authority over Indian
country"). See also Heisey, supra note 3, at 1056 (referring to Public Law 280 as "too draconian").
118. See Heisey, supra note 3, at 1054 (noting how states "are reluctant to allocate scarce state
funds to enforce tribal laws on the reservation").
119. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
120. See Clinton, supra note 12, at 549 (noting that "[n]o tribe has formally consented to the
extension of state criminal jurisdiction over its lands").
121. See generally Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction
Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1998) (arguing for reform of Public Law 280).
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C. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION
The Supreme Court has itself indicated that any change to the status
quo must come about only by Congressional action. 122 Thus, the Court
would appear to be opposed to judicial invalidation of the current
scheme even if procedural shortcomings in tribal court proceedings were
remedied. This is not to say, however, that the Court would not be
willing to do so if compelling arguments were made in support thereof
particularly true. This may be if failure to invalidate the current scheme
would result in Indian-Americans being continually left without judicial
recourse available to other Americans, similar to the plight of slaves who,
as the result of various state statutes, were also prohibited from participat-
ing in judicial proceedings. Moreover, if, as suggested above, a court
would conclude that the consequences of applying § 1152 have resulted
in de jure discrimination on the part of the federal government, the court
would be authorized to order specific and reasonable equitable measures
to be implemented by the federal government for purposes of remedy-
ing such discrimination.12 3
D. ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT IN PRESENT SYSTEM
One obvious alternative to either judicial or legislative action is for
the federal government to invest more money and resources into the
present system. The aforementioned October 1997 Department of Jus-
tice memorandum recommended precisely this option, at least for pur-
poses of improving law enforcement.124 After indicating that "[t]he
single most glaring problem is a lack of adequate resources in Indian
Country," 12 5 the report goes on to present an alarming picture of in-
creasing violent crime on reservations due to insufficient quality and
quantity of protective law enforcement. Moreover, the report indicates
that, if anything, the problem is actually worse than what available data
indicate:
There is broad consensus among law enforcement profession-
als and U.S. attorneys in Indian Country that the situation is
serious and merits urgent attention. Indeed, there is a concern
122. See, e.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
123. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (clarifying the
broad authority of lower federal courts to implement equitable remedies for purposes of ensuring
racial desegregation of public schools).
124. See Executive Committee Report, supra note 111.
125. See Executive Committee Report, supra note 111. For example, in 1996 only 32% of the
Tribes submitted official crime reports to the BIA. Much information comes from informal surveys.
Executive Committee Report, supra note 111.
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that available statistics understate the magnitude of the problem
in many areas of Indian Country. A major finding of a recent
DOJ Inspector General Report on Criminal Justice in Indian
Country was that there is a pervasive 'lack of reliable crime
statistics in Indian Country . . . .' Moreover, while law enforce-
ment resources have been increased and deployed effectively
throughout the United States, BIA resources actually have been
reduced in Indian Country during the past few years.126
While the report focuses on the proliferation of violent crime, its
findings are no doubt relevant to non-serious offenses as well. Thus, by
improving law enforcement capability, the tribes should be better able to
confront all classes of criminal activity. According to Phil Baridon,
Senior Policy Analyst in the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice, because tribal law enforcement is doing all it can to confront
violent crime, it is highly unlikely that non-serious offenses will be ad-
dressed to any appreciable degree; as a consequence, it is common prac-
tice that where non-serious crimes are committed by non-Indians against
Indians on Indian lands, the perpetrators, who are not expected to be
prosecuted by the federal government in the first place, are merely escort-
ed off the reservation by tribal police, and no further action is taken. 127
V. CONCLUSION
Current prohibitions against tribal courts exercising criminal juris-
diction over non-Indian defendants evolved from an era during which
white supremacist ideology dictated that the separate tribes be prevented
from establishing any political strength, and that Indians, who were not
citizens, should not be entitled to the protections of the white man's
courts. Such ideology supported federal and state legislative initiatives
which politically, geographically, and racially segregated the Indian.
These separatist policies presented no substantial jurisdictional problems
when the tribes had no real court systems and the reservations were rela-
tively distinct, isolated, and geographically removed. Within the tribes,
traditional means of justice could be freely administered for the reason
that such traditional means basically pertained only to the Indians them-
selves. Today, however, the boundaries of reservations are amorphous-
geographically, culturally, and racially; and as society and technology
evolve, these boundaries can only become less and less distinct. Conse-
quently, continued segregation of the Indian, if it is maintained, will
126. Executive Committee Report, supra note 111.
127. Telephone conversation with Phil Baridon (Dec. 3, 1998).
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necessarily imply more affirmative and deliberate conduct on the part of
the federal government.
Likewise, the effects of segregation, such as in the case of "non-
Indian on Indian" crime, have evolved into positive wrongs being
worked on Indians; these too must now be justified. There is no justifi-
cation, however, for depriving Indians-or anyone else-of the ability to
seek redress for crimes inflicted on them, or for providing their male-
factors a safe harbor from which to operate. Moreover, Indians, who are
now full citizens of both the federal government as well as the states
where they reside, are entitled to the same constitutional protections as
are enjoyed by all other citizens. Consequently, Congress cannot dis-
regard its duty to find a solution to the problems in this area merely
because they are complicated; nor should the courts allow the consti-
tutional rights of Indians to be further subdued either because it has
been tradition to do so, because they historically had no such rights, or
because it would be too expensive to enforce them. By reserving for it-
self exclusive jurisdictional authority, the federal government has chosen
to make itself the sole means by which Indians may seek redress for
certain crimes inflicted upon them. The federal government is obligated,
therefore, to prosecute on behalf of the Indian to at least the same degree
this protective government function is provided to other Americans.
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